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Abstract
Bossa is a development environment for operating-system process schedulers that provides numerous safety
guarantees. In this paper, we show how to automate the checking of safety properties of a scheduling policy
developed in this environment. We find that most of the relevant properties can be considered as invariant
or refinement properties. In order to automate the related proof obligations, we use the WS1S logic for
which a decision procedure is implemented by Mona. The proof techniques are implemented using the
FMona tool.
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1 Introduction
A Domain-Specific Language (DSL) is a language designed around the precise set
of constructs and abstractions that are relevant to a specific domain [8]. Such a
language captures domain expertise, guiding the programmer in the development
of programs that are concise, high level, and expressed in terms of common domain
abstractions. This technology has proved its value in easing program development
in a variety of domains in both research and industry [16].
In addition to easing the task of the programmer, DSL programs have the po-
tential to be highly safe and efficient, because the language can be tuned to ease
verification and optimization and because verification and optimization tools can be
tuned to common domain idioms. Nevertheless, creating a verifier or optimizer for a
programming language remains a difficult task, which is further complicated in the
case of DSLs by the need to start from scratch for each new language. A solution is
to build on existing general-purpose verification and optimization tools, but there
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is as yet little experience in this area. In this paper, we contribute to the body of
experience in this area by presenting a case study in using an existing verification
tool to construct a verifier for the Bossa DSL for implementing operating system
(OS) process schedulers [17].
Bossa
Process scheduling is an old problem, but there is no single scheduling policy that
is perfect for all applications. Indeed, in recent years, the emergence of new ap-
plications, such as multimedia and real-time applications, and new execution en-
vironments, such as embedded systems, has given rise to many new scheduling
algorithms [10,22,23]. As these algorithms are not available in standard OSes, the
developer of an application that requires a specific scheduling policy must imple-
ment it himself at the OS level. This is a difficult and error-prone task, requiring
substantial expertise in the target OS.
To address this issue, we have developed the Bossa environment for develop-
ing operating system process schedulers [17]. Bossa provides two DSLs: a speci-
fication language for describing the scheduling requirements of a given OS and a
programming language for implementing scheduling policies. Both languages offer
abstractions dedicated to the scheduling domain, allowing OS scheduling behavior
and scheduling policies to be described in a high-level and natural way. Bossa has
been ported to Linux and Chorus [12], and has been used in research projects [9]
and teaching.
Bossa has a well-defined semantics and an ad-hoc verifier [14]. The verifier uses
abstract interpretation to check that the specification of OS scheduling require-
ments is consistent and that the implementation of a scheduling policy satisfies the
specified requirements. The verification ensures that a scheduling policy considers
as eligible for execution only those processes that are able to run. Some other prop-
erties are also checked, such as the absence of null-pointer dereferences. This set of
checks ensures that a Bossa scheduler does not crash or hang the OS. Other prop-
erties, such as fairness and liveness could have been considered, but we have chosen
to focus on properties relating to the interaction with the OS, as such properties
are typically outside the expertise of the scheduling algorithm designer, and thus
fit well with the goal of DSLs to encapsulate expertise.
This paper
As the Bossa verifier is hand-crafted and mixes the encoding and checking of the
relevant properties, we have found that it is hard to maintain, especially when
extending the Bossa programming language. We have thus become interested in
implementing the Bossa verifications using an existing verification engine. Previ-
ously [5], we have studied how the Bossa methodology could be considered within
the B [1] formal method. This study showed that some of the verifications made
by Bossa could be expressed as proof obligations of B invariants or refinements.
However, most of these proof obligations were not discharged automatically by the
provers available in atelier B [7]: a tool supporting the refinement based B devel-
opment method [1]. The reasons include the lack of suitable decision procedures
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and abstraction generators, particularly given the fact that the number of processes
manipulated by a Bossa policy is unbounded. We thus needed to find a logic that
would allow Bossa code and properties to be expressed in a natural way, to facilitate
extension to new features, and a verification engine that would provide a decision
procedure for this logic.
In this paper, we show that the WS1S logic, via the interface of the FMona
tool [4], is well-suited for expressing Bossa code and properties. A decision procedure
for WS1S is provided by the Mona verification tool [13]. We are thus able to
automate the verification of all of the properties considered in our previous work,
and extend the approach to the other properties considered by the Bossa verifier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Bossa
and presents the associated verification problem in more detail. Section 3 introduces
the tools and techniques that we use. Section 4 considers the verification of the
specification of OS requirements. Section 5 presents the expression of scheduling
policies and their verification with respect to the specification of OS requirements.
Section 6 considers the relation between the verification methods that we use and
some others. Section 7 concludes and presents some future work.
2 Bossa in a Nutshell
In this section, we give an overview of the Bossa DSLs, and then consider issues
that arise in showing that a Bossa scheduling policy satisfies a specification.
2.1 The Bossa DSL for programming scheduling policies
A process scheduler is the part of an OS that is responsible for electing processes
to have access to the CPU. To do this, it must keep track of the set of processes
that are eligible for election and have a means of electing one of them. A scheduling
policy describes the strategy taken by the scheduler in these operations. These
operations are thus the focus of the constructs and abstractions provided by the
Bossa DSL for programming scheduling policies.
Rate Monotonic (RM) [15] is a scheduling policy often used to manage periodic
processes in real-time systems. When a process should be elected to have access to
the CPU, this policy picks the eligible process with the shortest period. Figure 1
shows an extract of the Bossa implementation of this scheduling policy. The imple-
mentation declares the process attributes (line 2), the process states (lines 3-10),
the ordering criteria (line 11) and the event handlers (lines 12-30). The process
attributes record policy-specific information about each process. In the RM policy,
this includes the process’s period. The ordering criteria, which is only provided for
priority-based policies, specifies the relative priority of processes. In the RM policy,
this specifies that the process with the shortest period should be given the highest
priority. We describe the process states and the event handlers in the rest of this
section.
The RM policy defines six process states: running, ready, yield, blocked,
computation ended, and terminated. A process managed by the policy is always
in exactly one of these states. Each process state is associated with a state class,
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which describes the eligibility of processes in the state. The state classes are as
follows:
• RUNNING: active processes (at most one on a uniprocessor),
• READY: processes eligible for election,
• KERNEL BLOCKED: processes that are ineligible due to their recent interaction with
the OS (e.g., request for I/O),
• POLICY BLOCKED: processes that are ineligible due to their recent interaction with
the scheduler (e.g., quantum expired),
• KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED: processes that are ineligible due to their recent interac-
tion with both the OS and the scheduler,
• TERMINATED: terminated processes
A policy may define multiple states within each state class, to express further re-
finements required by the policy. For example, the RM policy defines the ready
and yield states in the READY state class, to distinguish processes that are uncondi-
tionally ready to run (ready) from those that should only run if no other process is
available (yield). Finally, a data structure is associated with each state: a process
variable for a state that can contain at most one process or a queue for a state that
can contain an arbitrary number of processes.
Event handlers describe how the scheduling policy reacts to various OS events
that affect the eligibility of processes. Examples include process blocking, which
makes the blocking process ineligible, and process unblocking, which makes the
unblocking process eligible again. The set of events that must be handled is specific
to the targeted OS. For Linux 2.4, a policy must provide handlers for ten events.
We describe the unblock.preemptive handler (lines 14-19) in detail, as it illus-
trates most of the language constructs. This handler is triggered when a process
unblocks and the OS allows the scheduling policy to preempt the running process,
if desired. The handler manipulates the process e.target, which is the process
that is unblocking. It first checks that this process is currently blocked (e.target
in blocked, line 17). If so, the handler changes the state of the unblocking pro-
cess to ready (line 18) and then checks whether the running process should be
preempted (line 19). For the latter, it tests whether there is a running process
(!empty(running)) and whether the priority of the unblocking process is greater
than that of the running process (e.target > running). If both conditions are
satisfied, then the state of the running process is changed to ready, requesting that
it be preempted.
The language also provides operations on integers and time, loops over queues,
etc. It does not provide unbounded loops or recursive functions.
2.2 The Bossa DSL for specifying OS scheduling requirements
A scheduling policy must interact with the target OS at the lowest level. At this
level, OSes vary widely, and thus the definition of a scheduling policy must be
tuned to that of the target OS. To address this issue, the set of event handlers,
the requirements on their behavior, and the possible interactions between them are
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scheduler RM = { 1
process = { time period; cycles wcet; timer period timer; int missed deadlines; } 2
states = { 3
RUNNING running : process; 4
READY ready : select queue; 5
READY yield : process; 6
KERNEL BLOCKED blocked : queue; 7
POLICY BLOCKED computation ended : queue; 8
TERMINATED terminated; 9
} 10
ordering criteria = { lowest period } 11
handler (event e) { 12
/* event block.*: e.target blocks */ 13
On block.* { e.target => blocked; } 14
/* event unblock.preemptive: e.target unblocks */ 15
On unblock.preemptive { 16
if (e.target in blocked) { 17
e.target => ready; 18
if ((!empty(running)) && (e.target > running)) { running => ready; } 19
} 20
} 21
/* event yield.user.*: e.target wants to yield to any eligible process */ 22
On yield.user.* { e.target => yield; } 23
/* event bossa.schedule: e.target OS requests process election */ 24
On bossa.schedule { 25
if (empty(ready)) { yield => ready; } 26
select() => running; 27
if (!empty(yield)) { yield => ready; } 28
} 29
} 30
interface = { . . . } 31
} 32
Fig. 1. Extract of the Bossa Rate Monotonic scheduling policy
not fixed by Bossa, but specified for each OS by an expert in the OS’s process
management behavior. This specification consists of a set of event types and an
event automaton.
The event types describe the set of required event handlers and the requirements
on their behavior. The latter are specified in terms of preconditions and postcon-
ditions on the states of relevant processes, such as the process generating the event
(the source) or the process affected by the event (the target). Each event type rule
describes a mapping of processes to states that can occur when the event is gener-
ated and the set of mappings of processes to states that are allowed on completion
of the event handler. The specification is expressed in terms of the state classes, to
be policy independent. As an example, the requirements on the block.* handler
might be expressed as follows:
block.* : [tgt in RUNNING] -> [tgt in KERNEL_BLOCKED]
This rule specifies that when a process (tgt) blocks, it must be in a state of the
RUNNING state class, and the handler must put the blocking process in a state of
the KERNEL BLOCKED state class, to record that the process is ineligible. This rule,
however, is not sufficient to capture the possible interactions between the scheduler
and the OS that can occur in e.g. Linux 2.4. The appendix presents the more
complex Linux 2.4 block.* event type.
The event automaton describes the sequences in which the OS generates the
various events. For example, to terminate a process in Linux 2.4, the OS first blocks
the terminating process, then elects some other process, and eventually generates
23
Bodeveix, Filali, Lawall, and Muller
a process.end event to remove the process from the scheduler. Some sequences
are uninterruptible; for example, Linux 2.4 always requests the election of a new
process immediately after blocking a process, with no interruption possible between
them. For the interruptible sequences, the OS expert also provides information
about which events can occur during interrupts. The Bossa event type compiler
augments the event automaton with all permutations of these events at each step
in any interruptible sequence.
2.3 The Bossa verification problem
The Bossa verifier applies various consistency checks to the OS specification and to
scheduling policies. We describe these checks below.
For the OS specification, the main goal is to ensure that the event types are
consistent. Bossa distinguishes between context sensitive and automatic events.
Context-sensitive events occur only if the mapping of processes to states satisfies
the preconditions of the corresponding event types. An example is unblocking, which
originates at the OS level, where process states are known. There are no consistency
requirements in this case. Automatic events occur regardless of the current mapping
of processes to states. An example is blocking, which derives from actions at the
user level where process states are unknown. Consistency requires that the event
type specify at least one allowed behavior for each mapping of processes to states
that can hold when the event occurs. To check this, the verifier takes into account
all possible sequences of events as specified by the event automaton, and all possible
effects of the events along these sequences, as specified by the event type rules.
For a policy, the main goal is to ensure that the event handlers are well defined
(e.g., no null-pointer dereferences) and that they respect the event types. In this,
the verifier uses the event types, instantiated according to the states defined by the
policy, and the event automaton, to identify inter-handler effects. For each mapping
of processes to states that is allowed by the event types and reachable according to
the event automaton, the verifier analyzes each execution path through the event
handler to determine the effect on the process states. The resulting mapping of
processes to states must be compatible with the postconditions specified by the
event type rules. This part of the verifier has been presented in detail previously
[14].
Both forms of verification rely on analysis of all possible execution paths, sug-
gesting that model checking would be appropriate. Standard model checking tech-
niques, however, are limited to finite state spaces. In the case of Bossa, the size
of the state space is determined by the number of processes, which in general is
not bounded. We thus turn to the Mona tool [13], which is able to reason in the
presence of unknown integer values.
3 The Mona verification tool
In this section, we first review the Mona tool [13]. We then describe transition
systems, properties, and verification techniques in this setting.
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3.1 Mona
Mona implements a decision procedure for the logic WS1S, defined as follows:
Definition 1 (The WS1S logic) Let {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of first-order variables
and {X1, . . . , Xn} a set of second-order variables. A minimal grammar for the WS1S
logic as follows:
• a term t is defined by: t ::= 0 | xi | s(t), where s is the successor symbol.
• a formula f is defined by:
f ::= t ∈ Xi | ¬f | f ∧ f | ∃1xi. f | ∃2Xi. f (1st and 2nd order quantification)
A closed formula is WS1S valid if its interpretation over the set N of natural numbers
is valid. First-order variables denote natural numbers and second-order variables
denote finite subsets of N. The logic is decidable.
To express properties relevant to Bossa, we use the FMona [4] high-level interface
for Mona. This interface allows declaring enumerated types, records with updates,
quantification over finite structured types, and parameterized higher-order macros.
FMona code is automatically translated into Mona.
As an example, we consider the definition of a notion similar to superposition [6].
We suppose that we have an automaton, the states of which are identified by the
Location type, and a relation tr over the data type Data. The superposition of
tr to a transition is a new relation that is defined over the “superposed” type
record{d:Data; w:Location;} as follows:
pred superpose(type Data, type Location, pred(var Data d,d’) tr,
var Location l,l’, var record{d: Data; w: Location;} s,s’) =
s.w = l ∧ s’.w = l’ ∧ tr(s.d,s’.d);
Partial application is possible. For example, if l1 and l2 are locations, then
superpose(tr,l1,l2) 2 is a predicate over pairs of the superposed type.
3.2 Transition systems and properties
We define a transition system as a triple composed of a state space, an initialisation
predicate and a binary relation called the transition relation. In our case, systems
are parameterized by the number of processes. Mona can analyze properties of
such systems even if the parameter has not been instantiated, which is the essential
advantage of Mona over traditional model checking in our context. In this paper,
we consider safety properties expressed as invariants. Following Mona terminology,
we do not distinguish between a property and a predicate.
Definition 2 (Invariant) A predicate P is said to be invariant with respect to a
transition system if it is true in the transition system’s initial states and is preserved
by its transition relation.
Invariance properties rely on stability and do not consider actual executions.
When invariance cannot be established, we can consider a weaker property: the
predicate always true [19], i.e., satisfied over all the reachable states.
2 Type parameters are automatically synthesized.
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Definition 3 (always true predicate) A state s is said to be reachable with re-
spect to a transition system S if there exists a sequence s0, . . . , sn = s such that s0
is an initial state of S and for each i < n the states si and si+1 are related by the
transition relation. The predicate P is said to be always true if it is satisfied by each
reachable state.
In FMona, we introduce the macro always true, which is parameterized by
the type of the state space, the predicate we wish to check as always true, the
initialisation predicate, and transition relation:
pred always true(type State, pred(var State s) p,
pred(var State s) init,pred(var State s,s’) tr) =
all State s: reachable(init,tr,s) ⇒ p(s);
pred reachable(type State,
pred(var State s) init, pred(var State s,s’) tr, var State s) =
ex array nat of State A: ex nat i: A[i]=s ∧ init(A[0]) ∧
all nat j where j < i: tr(A[j],A[j+1]);
3.3 Verification techniques
We use refinement to prove that a concrete specification is correct with respect to an
abstract specification, abstraction to prove that a property holds in a concrete sys-
tem, and iteration to calculate fixed points. We recall the definitions of refinement
and abstraction, and then show how iterative techniques are implemented within
FMona.
Definition 4 (Refinement) A transition system Sc (said to be concrete) refines
a transition system Sa (said to be abstract) if there exists a relation ϕ between the
states of the concrete transition system and the states of the abstract one such that:
• Each initial state of the concrete transition system is related by ϕ to an initial
state of the abstract transition system.
• Given a concrete state c and an abstract state a related by ϕ, then for each
element c’ related to c by the concrete transition relation, there exists an element
a’ related to a by the abstract transition relation.
Definition 5 (Abstraction) Let C = (Sc, Ic,→c) be a transition system, Sa a
state space called “abstract” and ϕ a relation over Sc × Sa. The abstraction of C
through ϕ is a transition system (Sa, Ia,→a) where
• Ia is the image by ϕ of Ic: Ia = ϕ(Ic),
• →a is the set of images by ϕ of pairs connected through →c.
sa →a s
′
a , ∃sc s
′
c : ϕ(sc, sa) ∧ ϕ(s
′
c, s
′
a) ∧ sc →c s
′
c
The implementation of iterative techniques. Most of the temporal properties
that we are interested in can be expressed as fixed points [2]. However, since we do
not have general decidability results for reaching the fixed point, we must provide
a bound on the number of iterations required to reach it. The macro backward
is parameterized by the number of iterations N , the transition system defined by
the predicates init and tr and the predicate to verify inv. Starting from a state
characterized by the negation of inv, after n iterations (through the recursive macro
iterate) of the inverse of the transition relation, we check that a fixed point has
actually been reached (through the stable predicate) without reaching any initial
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state. In this way, we verify that a path between an initial state and a state satisfying
¬inv does not exist.
pred backward(type S, var nat N,
pred(var S s) init, pred(var S s,s’) tr, pred(var S s) inv) =
check bwd(init,tr,iterate(N,NOT(inv),inverse(tr)));
pred iterate(type S, var nat N,
pred(var S s) start, pred(var S s,s’) tr, var S s) =
if N = 0 then start(s)
else ex S s’: iterate(N−1,start,tr,s’) ∧ (s’ = s | tr(s’,s)) endif;
pred check bwd(type S, pred(var S s) init, pred(var S s,s’) tr,
pred(var S s) bad)=
stable(bad,inverse(tr)) ∧ all S s: bad(s) ⇒ ∼init(s)
4 Verifying the OS Specification using Mona
In this section, we present how the event types and event automaton are translated
into FMona and how some of their properties are expressed. Among these proper-
ties, we consider the preservation of the representation invariant and of the number
of processes in the system, and the satisfaction of event preconditions. The trans-
lation of the event types and event automaton has been automated. The properties
are automatically checked by Mona for any number of processes.
4.1 Translation of the event types
We represent a Bossa state class by the set of processes associated with it. The state
of the system is then represented by the record Classes where each field represents
a state class. The additional state class NOWHERE represents processes that are not
managed by the scheduler.
var nat NProc; # maximal number of processes
type Proc = ... NProc; # interval type: 0..NProc-1
type Classes = record {
RUNNING, READY, KERNEL BLOCKED, POLICY BLOCKED, KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED,
TERMINATED, NOWHERE: set of Proc;};
We represent the event type associated with a given event by a “before-after”
predicate that is the disjunction of the relations associated with the various type
rules. For example, if block.* were defined by a single type rule:
block.* : [tgt in RUNNING] -> [tgt in KERNEL BLOCKED]
then the following predicates would be automatically generated:
• Eblock , which defines a before-after relation between elements of type Classes,
parameterized by the source (src) and target (tgt) processes. 3
pred Eblock (var Proc src, tgt, var Classes s,s’) =
(({tgt} ⊆ s.RUNNING) ∧ (s’ = s with {
RUNNING := s.RUNNING \ {tgt}; READY := s.READY \ {tgt};
KERNEL BLOCKED := s.KERNEL BLOCKED \ {tgt} ∪ {tgt};}));
POLICY BLOCKED := s.POLICY BLOCKED \ {tgt};
KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED := s.KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED \ {tgt};
TERMINATED := s.TERMINATED \ {tgt};
NOWHERE := s.NOWHERE \ {tgt};
In order to simplify the FMona code generation, the processes occurring in
the left hand side of a rule are always subtracted from every state class. This
approach is mainly useful when the left hand side contains a disjunction of filters,
as it is then unnecessary to examine them separately. Although the resulting
3 The block.* event does not have a source process. Nevertheless, the signature of the translated type
contains src and tgt, to allow systematic use of generic macros.
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FMona code is somewhat verbose, it does not need to be simplified since Mona
generates an equivalent automaton-based internal representation for all equivalent
formulas.
• block , which is the disjunction of the transitions Eblock for any possible values
of src and tgt.
pred block (var Classes s,s’) = ex Proc src, tgt: Eblock (src,tgt,s,s’);
4.2 Verification of intra-event properties
The event type should not allow a scheduling policy to put a process in more than
one state, to put multiple processes in the state of the RUNNING state class, or to drop
processes. These properties are straightforwardly encoded as invariant properties
or as the preservation of a state expression.
4.3 Verification of inter-event properties
The sequencing of events is described by the Bossa event automaton. Within this
automaton, Bossa distinguishes between automatic events and context-sensitive
events. The event types must be constructed such that at every point in the automa-
ton where an automatic event appears, the state of the system obtained by every
path to that point is compatible with at least one of the preconditions indicated by
the event’s type.
To check this property, we must take into account the complete dynamics of the
system. This is represented by the combination of the event automaton, the event
types, and the system state (Classes) to describe the mapping of processes to state
classes before and after each event. The resulting transition relation is defined on
the state space NClasses:
type Location = ... 12; # number of automata states
type NClasses = record { d: Classes; w: Location; };
The transition relation itself, NNext, is defined by superposing the relations describ-
ing the event types (block , etc.) to the transitions in the event automaton. The
disjunction of the representations of the event types for the events occurring in in-
terrupts is superposed to automata states that represent interruptible points in the
event sequences. The representations of the remaining type rules are superposed to
the corresponding automaton transitions.
pred interrupts(var Classes s,s’) = # interrupt events
unblock preemptive(s,s’) | unblock timer target (s,s’) | ...;
pred NNext(var NClasses s,s’) = # Labeling of automaton transitions by events
superpose(interrupts,2,2,s,s’) | superpose(interrupts,4,4,s,s’) | ...
| superpose(block ,0,1,s,s’) | superpose(bossa schedule,1,4,s,s’) | ...;
Our goal is to check that every reachable state of the system satisfies the pre-
conditions of the automatic events allowed from this state. However, computing
the reachable states of the system cannot be automatic in general because the state
space is parameterized by the number of processes. Thus, we use a finite abstraction
of the state space where a boolean is associated to each class indicating whether
the class is empty (false value) or not.
type AClasses = record {
RUNNING, READY, KERNEL BLOCKED, POLICY BLOCKED, KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED,
TERMINATED, NOWHERE: bool;};
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This type is extended by the state locations of the automaton:
type NAClasses = record { d: AClasses; w: Location;};
The abstraction relation between the state space of classes and its abstraction
AClasses contains the representation invariant inv (4.2) and the definition of each
boolean field:
pred state abs(var Classes s, var AClasses a) =
inv(s) ∧ (a.RUNNING ↔ s.RUNNING 6= ∅) ∧ (a.READY ↔ s.READY 6= ∅) ∧
(a.KERNEL BLOCKED ↔ s.KERNEL BLOCKED 6= ∅) ∧
(a.POLICY BLOCKED ↔ s.POLICY BLOCKED 6= ∅) ∧
(a.KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED ↔ s.KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED 6= ∅) ∧
(a.TERMINATED ↔ s.TERMINATED 6= ∅) ∧ (a.NOWHERE ↔ s.NOWHERE 6= ∅);
The predicate nabs extends the abstraction relation to the state space of the
superposed automaton. It takes as argument a concrete value of type NClasses and
an abstract value of type NAClasses, and maps state locations to themselves and
abstracts the process sets attached to each class to booleans.
pred nabs(var NClasses c,var NAClasses a)= c.w=a.w ∧ state abs(c.d,a.d);
The satisfaction of preconditions can now be expressed at the abstract level:
each concrete counterpart of an abstract state must satisfy the preconditions of
automatic events. We first introduce a predicate check pre over concrete states of
type NClasses, asserting that the guards of automatic events allowed by the au-
tomaton at the current state are satisfied. The abstract level predicate check(var
NAClasses a) expresses that all the concretisations of a through nabs satisfy
check pre.
Backward analysis of the abstract system, which terminates here after one step,
leads to the verification of this property on each reachable abstract state and thus
on a superset of the reachable concrete states. Given macros AInit and ANext
that compute the abstraction of the initialisation and the transition relation of the
concrete system, the property is checked by the following assertion:
backward(1, ANext(NNext,nabs), AInit(NInit,nabs),check);
Remarks
• This study revealed an error in the abstraction of the behaviour of the Linux
kernel as described by Bossa event types. The analysis performed by Bossa tools
did not detect the error because it performs a less accurate analysis: it considers
an abstraction of state classes using three values (empty, nonempty, unknown),
and no verifications are performed on unknown states.
• Even if it is theoretically possible to compute the set of reachable states of the ab-
stract system, its computational complexity makes doing so hard. This is why we
have applied an iterative method. Its convergence is however guaranteed because
the abstract state space is finite, even though the transitions are parameterized
by the number of processes.
• The analysis performed here amounts to model checking, but because the tran-
sition relations over the state space NAClasses are parameterized, a finite-state
model checker is not directly applicable. The use of a finite state model checker
would require a program transformation, which is usually hard to validate. In
our proposal, abstraction is specified at the semantic level. The correctness of
the method relies on a simple meta-level theorem.
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5 Verifying Scheduling Policies using Mona
In this section, we show how the process states and event handlers defined by a
Bossa scheduling policy (see Figure 1) are translated into FMona, and how their
conformance to the event types is verified.
5.1 Bossa specification of process states and event handlers
Process-state declarations are automatically translated into FMona as a type dec-
laration, which associates each state with a set of processes, and a gluing invariant
relating states and classes. This gluing invariant also includes a representation in-
variant for states, building on the one for state classes:
type Bstates = record {
running: set of Proc;
ready: set of Proc;
yield: set of Proc;
blocked: set of Proc;
computation ended: set of Proc;
terminated: set of Proc;
};
pred Bstates2Classes(var Bstates c,
var Classes a) =
inv(a) ∧ # representation invariant
a.RUNNING = c.running
∧ a.READY = c.ready ∪ c.yield
∧ c.ready ∩ c.yield = ∅
∧ a.KERNEL BLOCKED = c.blocked
∧ a.POLICY BLOCKED = c.computation ended
∧ a.KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED = ∅
∧ a.TERMINATED = c.terminated;
The translation of event handlers to FMona relies on a weakest precondition
calculus over the Bossa statements. An abstraction of subexpressions that cannot
be translated into FMona (arithmetic expressions, etc.) is also performed. State
updates and emptiness checks are preserved.
Bossa event handlers can be partially defined. For example, it is only allowed to
put a process in a state designated as a process variable if the state is empty. In
order to guarantee the wellformedness of event handlers, preconditions are generated
in such cases. For example, in the following handler, because the state yield is
implemented as a variable (see Figure 1, line 6), the transition to yield is only
valid if yield is empty:
On yield.user.* { e.target => yield; }
The FMona translation of this handler includes the condition yield=∅ which, when
not satisfied, blocks the transition. We will prove that this cannot occur.
pred Byield system pause (var Proc src, tgt, var Bstates s,s’) =
((s.yield = ∅) ∧
(s’ = s with { running := s.running \ {tgt}; ready := (s.ready \ {tgt});
yield := s.yield ∪ {tgt}; blocked := (s.blocked \ {tgt});
computation ended := s.computation ended \ {tgt};
terminated := s.terminated \ {tgt};}));
5.2 Verification of a policy
We now show how to use FMona to express the conformance of a policy with
the event types. This property is based on the existence of a refinement relation
between transitions over the Classes type, said to be abstract, and transitions over
the Bstates type, said to be concrete. It amounts to instantiating the event type
rules, which are defined in terms of state classes, with respect to the states defined
by a given policy.
The generic refinement property for preconditioned transitions (used here) is
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instantiated and expressed as a predicate over the concrete type:
pred check ref(type State c, type State a,
pred(var State c s c,var State a s a) ϕ,
pred(var State c s c, s c’) tr c,
pred(var State a s a, s a’) tr a, var State c s c) =
(all State c s c’: all State a s a:
(tr c(s c,s c’) ∧ ϕ(s c,s a) ∧ pre(tr a,s a))
⇒ ex State a s a’: tr a(s a,s a’) ∧ ϕ(s c’,s a’)) ∧
all State c s c: all State a s a: (ϕ(s c,s a) ∧ pre(tr a,s a))
⇒ pre(tr c,s c);
This refinement property, however, is not usually valid. For example, a transition
towards the yield state is only possible if this state is empty. As the event type does
not require the associated state class READY to be empty, there is no refinement. We
must thus take into account executions allowed by the automaton and only check
the refinement on concrete states of type Bstates of which a given abstraction is
reachable. This abstraction is obtained by representing each state by a boolean that
is true if the state is not empty. The concrete and abstract states are superposed
to those of the automaton. The refinement property is then verified for all concrete
counterparts of reachable abstract states. Only allowed transitions from a given
state are taken into account. In our case, convergence was obtained after three
backward applications of the abstract transition. In general, the convergence of the
iterative method is ensured because the abstract state space is finite. The size of
the state space can, however, be much larger than the number of iterations required
(640 vs. 3 in the case of the RM policy).
6 Related work
In this paper, we have automated the proof of Bossa scheduler properties using
the WS1S logic and Mona. It is interesting to remark that, although the worst-
case complexity of this logic is non-elementary, the computations required by the
considered scheduling structures seem to be feasible. This confirms the results
obtained for other domains, such as the static analysis of data structures [11] and
software structures [21].
Other methods and proof techniques could have been used. Concerning methods,
we mention the B method, which we have used in our previous study [5]. Never-
theless, the approach presented here requires some features that are not supported
by B, namely taking into account the event automaton and the use of abstractions.
Our use of these features widened the set of properties that could be expressed,
while remaining within WS1S logic. This, in turn, allowed the proof obligations to
be discharged automatically.
Concerning proof techniques, states could have been represented by counters.
Since Mona implements Presburger arithmetic, Mona could have been used. How-
ever tools dedicated to arithmetic such as FAST [3] should be more efficient. The use
of the WS1S logic allowed us to avoid abstracting sets as counters. Petri nets [20]
could also have been used. Although the use of counters is restricted in this case,
it should be possible to elaborate models. In both cases, the considered properties
cannot be decided automatically and require either making abstractions or applying
convergence accelerations.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to use Mona to check Bossa properties that
were previously checked by specific tools. This approach separates the generation
of proof obligations, which remains Bossa-specific, from the construction of the
associated proofs, which is performed by a generic tool. Because the generation
of proof obligations is much simpler than proof construction, this approach should
make it easier to extend and modify the Bossa verifier as the needs of the language
evolve. Extensions can furthermore transparently use features of the automated
prover that were not built into the Bossa verifier, such as reasoning about integers.
Nevertheless, while this study considers the safety properties checked by the Bossa
verifier, it does not address some properties that are used by the Bossa compiler to
generate optimized code. A stronger coupling between Bossa and FMona is needed.
The use of a general purpose verifier may seem potentially less efficient than
a verifier dedicated to the requirements of Bossa. Nevertheless, there has been
substantial research and resources dedicated to improving the efficiency of general-
purpose provers, which goes beyond the resources typically available for developing
tools for a domain-specific language. In practice, we have observed that our ap-
proach gives the same performance as the Bossa verifier, around one minute to
verify a typical scheduling policy. In particular, our use of iterative techniques,
which avoid second-order quantification, greatly improves the performance with
respect to both execution time and memory space.
The Bossa verifier checks properties related to the scheduling requirements of
the OS. Using our approach, properties concerning the scheduling algorithm and
the scheduled application can now also be considered. For instance, does the imple-
mentation of a scheduler satisfy a given property? And will an application meet its
deadlines under a given scheduler? Finally, the generation of certified code as well
as proof annotated code [18] could be considered in the future.
Availability Bossa is available at http://www.emn.fr/x-info/bossa/.
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A The block.* event type for Linux 2.4
The requirements on the block.* event in the context of Linux 2.4 are specified as
follows:
block.*: [tgt in RUNNING]->[tgt in KERNEL_BLOCKED]
block.*: [[] = RUNNING,tgt in READY]->[tgt in KERNEL_BLOCKED]
block.*: [[] = RUNNING,tgt in POLICY_BLOCKED]->[tgt in KERNEL_POLICY_BLOCKED]
A process is always executing when it blocks. The first rule thus specifies that when
the blocking process (tgt) is in the state of the RUNNING state class, the handler
must put the blocking process in a state of the KERNEL BLOCKED state class, to record
that the process is ineligible. An executing process, however, is not always in the
state of the RUNNING state class. As illustrated by unblock.preemptive handler
(line 17, Figure 1), a handler can request preemption of the executing process,
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by changing its state from the state of the RUNNING state class to a state of the
READY state class, if the process is still considered eligible for election, or to a state
of the POLICY BLOCKED state class, if not. The remaining rules thus consider the
cases where preemption has been requested in this manner. In the former case, the
blocking process must be put in a state of the KERNEL BLOCKED state class to record
that it is ineligible due to its interaction with the OS. In the latter case, it must
be put in a state of the KERNEL POLICY BLOCKED state class to record that when
the process unblocks, becoming eligible from the point of view of the OS, it is still
ineligible from the point of view of the scheduling policy.
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